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Recently, a hierarchy of probabilistic complexity classes generalizing NP has emerged in the 
work of Babai [Z], Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff 181, and Goldwasser and Sipser [ 121. 
The class IP is defined through the computational model of an interactive prover-verifier pair. 
Both Turing machines in a pair receive a common input and exchange messages. Every move 
of the verifier as well as its final determination of whether to accept or reject M’ is the result 
of random polynomial time computations on the input and all messages sent so far. The 
prover has no resource bounds. A language, L, is in IP if there is a prover-verifier pair such 
that (1) when U’E L, the verifier accepts with probability at least 1 - 2 ‘I and (2) when H’ 4 L. 
the verifier interacting with any prover accepts with probability at most 2-l”‘. Such a prover- 
verifier pair is called an interactive proof for L. In addition to detining interactive proofs. 
Goldwasser, Micah, and Rackoff [8] further defined zero-knowledge interactive proofs. Infor- 
mally, an interacting pair is a zero-knowledge proof for a language, L, if it is an interactive 
proof for L with the additional constraint that the prover reveals “nothing” (except language 
membership) to any verifier that the vernier could not have computed itself. There are three 
formal definitions for “nothing” which lead to three types of zero-knowledge: perfect, statisti- 
cal, and computational, each more restrictive than the next. We show that the first and second 
definitions are very restrictive. Specifically, any language, L. that has a statistical zero- 
knowledge interactive proof with an unbounded number of interactions has an interactive 
proof with two interactions. This complements a result by Fortnow [7] who showed that 
under the same hypothesis, the complement of L has an interactive proof with two inter- 
actions (“ 1991 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The class NP has traditionally been recognized to capture the notion of efficient 
provability, containing those languages for which there exist polynomial length 
proofs of membership which can be verified in polynomial time. Recently, a 
hierarchy of probabilistic complexity classes generalizing this notion of efficient 
provability has emerged in the work of Babai [2], Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff 
[S], and Goldwasser and Sipser [12]. The class IP is defined through the com- 
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putational model of an interactive prover-verifier pair. Both Turing machines in a 
pair receive a common input, w, and exchange up to a polynomial in [WI number 
of messages, each of which has length at most a polynomial in 1~1. The verifier’s 
moves and its final determination of whether to accept or reject w result from ran- 
dom polynomial time computations on w and all messages sent so far. The prover 
has no resource bounds. A language, L, is in IP[f(n)] if there exists an interactive 
prover-verifier pair that on input w exchanges at most f( ( WI ) messages such that 
(1) when w E L, the verifier interacting with the prover accepts with probability at 
least 1 - 2 -“‘I and (2) when w $ L, the verifier interacting with any prover accepts 
with probability at most 2- . ‘II.’ Such a prover-verifier pair is called an interactive 
proof for L. Let IP = uk IP[nk]. Just as in the case when L E NP , when LE IP, 
membership in L is efficiently verifiable since the verifier runs in polynomial time 
and determines membership correctly with probability very close to one. However, 
IP is thought to strictly contain NP since several languages which have resisted all 
attempts to be placed in NP have been shown to be in IP, for example, Graph 
Non-Isomorphism [ 111, Matrix Group Non-Membership, and Matrix Group 
Order [Z]. 
In addition to defining interactive proofs, Goldwasser, Micah, and Rackoff [S] 
further defined zero-knowledge interactive proofs. The zero-knowledge definition 
was motivated by cryptographic considerations. (For motivation and applica- 
tions of zero-knowledge see, for example, [9, 111.) Informally, a prover is zero- 
knowledge for a language if the prover reveals no useful information (other than 
language membership) when interacting with any verifier. Slightly more formally, a 
prover is zero-knowledge for L if for any verifier there is a probabilistic polynomial 
time simulator that, on inputs in L, produces conversations with the “same” prob- 
ability distribution as the prover interacting with that verifier. Actually, three inter- 
pretations of “same” lead to three types of zero-knowledge, each more restrictive 
than the next. When “same” is informally interpreted as (1) identical, (2) almost 
identical, or (3) equivalent with respect to probabilistic polynomial time, then the 
prover is said to be perfect zero-knowledge, statistical zero-knowledge, or computa- 
tional zero-knowledge for L, respectively. A language, L, is in PZK (SZK, CZK) 
if there is an interacting prover-verifier pair which is an interactive proof for L with 
the additional property that the prover is perfect (statistical, computational) zero- 
knowledge for L. 
Requiring that, for inputs in the language, the conversations between the prover 
and every verifier be accurately reproducible by some random polynomial time 
machine would seem to be a severe constraint on the power of the prover and hence 
the power of the zero-knowledge model. Surprisingly, for computational zero- 
knowledge this is probably not the case. Through the work of [il, 5, 131 it has 
been shown that, assuming secure encryption exists, any interactive proof can be 
transformed into a computational zero-knowledge proof, i.e., CZK = IP. 
Fortnow [7] was the first to provide evidence that the statistical zero-knowledge 
requirement may restrict the power of the prover. He proved that if a language has 
a statistical zero-knowledge proof, then the complement of the language has a 
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bounded round interactive proof, i.e., SZK E co-IP [2]. From this theorem we can 
deduce that it is unlikely that SZK contains all of NP since if NP c SZK then 
co-NP 5 IP[2], which further implies that the polynomial time hierarchy collapses 
to IP[2] by [4]. This is especially interesting because it implies that membership 
in SZK can be taken as evidence that a language is no? NP complete. A particularly 
important example of this is Graph Isomorphism, which was shown to be in SZK 
by C111. 
While Fortnow’s result did imply that SZK is probably weaker than IP (IP con- 
tains NP whereas SZK probably does not), it still left open the possibility that SZK 
contained languages in IP which required a polynomial number of interactions. In 
this paper we show that this cannot be the case. We prove that any language which 
is recognized by an unbounded round statistical zero-knowledge proof can also be 
recognized by a two-round interactive proof, i.e., SZK E IP[Z]. Hence, under the 
assumption that IP # IP[2], the statistical zero-knowledge condition on the prover 
severely restricts the power of unbounded round interactive proofs. Our result does 
not depend on any unproven cryptographic assumptions. 
We should note that, due to the fact that our proof techniques relativize, it is 
undoubtedly not possible to strengthen our result to get CZK E IP[Z]. Such a 
result would imply that IP[2] = IP if secure encryption functions exist (since 
CZK = IP under the same assumption, as states above). However, Aiello, 
Goldwasser, and Hastad [l] have separated IP[2] and IP with an oracle. We 
strongly believe that their construction can be modified to incorporate the existence 
of a one-way permutation. Hence, relative to such an oracle. CZK & IP[2] imply- 
ing that no proof of containment can relativize. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give the basic definitions 
that are needed in the paper. We give the intuition behind the proof in Section 3. 
In Section 4 we recall some facts about estimating sizes of sets using interactive 
proofs, and in Section 5 we state and prove the main theorem. 
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS 
In this section we give the formal definitions needed for the paper. Let P denote 
a prover: any probabilistic Turing machine which has a “communication” tape 
(for a formal definition of a “communication” tape see [8]). P has no resource 
bounds. Let V denote a verifier: any probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine 
with a communication tape. Let P t-f V denote an interacting proverrverilier pair: 
any prover and verifier that share the same input tape and communication tape 
(initially empty) and interact in rounds in the following way: 
(1) The verifier, V, makes a probabilistic polynomial time computation based 
on the input, the contents of its memory, and all messages thus far received over 
the communication tape from the prover, P. 
(2) V transmits the result of the computation over the communication tape 
to P. We denote the message sent by V in round i by .yzi , 
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(3) P performs a probabilistic computation based on the input, and all 
messages thus far received over the communication tape from V. 
(4) P transmits the result of the computation over the communication tape 
to V. We denote the message sent by P in round i by yZi. 
The number of rounds is at most a polynomial in the input length and the inter- 
action is terminated by the verifier accepting or rejecting. 
Let P+-+ V(w) denote a transcript of the interaction between the prover and the 
verifier. This is of course a stochastic variable depending on P’s and V’s random 
choices. 
DEFINITION. A given P ++ V is cc-complete for a language, L, if for all w E L the 
probability that V accept on w is at least ~1. 
DEFINITION. A verifier, V, is /?-sound for a language, L, if for all P’ H V and all 
w $ L the probability that V rejects on w is at least 8. 
Goldwasser, Micah, and Rackoff [S] defined the class IP as follows. L is in 
IP[f(n)] if there exists an interacting prover-verifier pair, PO V, that exchanges 
at most f(n) messages (n being the length of the input) such that 
(1) P ct V is (1 - 2 -“)-complete for L, and 
(2) V is (1 - 2-“)-sound for L. 
Call such a Pt* V an interactive proof for L. Note that membership in L is still 
efficiently verifiable since V runs in polynomial time and verifies membership 
correctly with probability very close to one. Define IP as the union over k of 
IP[nk]. 
We make several remarks here. First, we can assume without loss of generality 
that on inputs of size n all messages sent by P and V are of the same length, m(n), 
and all conversations consist of the same number of messages, d(n), where m and 
d are polynomials and n is the length of the input. Second, any language, L, which 
has an interactive prover-verifier pair, P t, V, such that P ++ V is (4 + &)-complete 
for L and V is ($ + &)-sound for L (for constant E > 0) also has an interactive proof, 
P’ ti I/‘, for L. P’c-) V’ just simulates P tf V a polynomial number of times 
(depending on E) and V’ accepts if V is accepted in a majority of the simulations. 
Third, it is easy to see that replacing the (1 - 2- “)-soundness condition with a 
l-soundness condition collapses IP down to NP. It is not as easy to see that requiring 
l-completeness does not affect the power of the model. The proof of this fact was 
given by Goldreich, Mansour, and Sipser [lo]. 
2.1. Zero-Knowledge 
In this section we give the formal definition of a zero-knowledge interactive proof 
for a language. We first need some properties of probability distributions on strings. 
Let A(w) and B(w) be two parameterized discrete random variables. Let 
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ACLI = M l) I u w E L} and similarly define B[L]. We define three types of equiva- 
lence between A[L] and B[L]: 
(1) ACLI =pBCLl or A [L] is perfectly equivalent to B[L] if for all y, and 
all M’ E L, 
Pr[A(rtj)=y]=Pr[B(w)=y] 
(2) At-L1 -s(k,N) B[L] or A[L] is (k, N)-statistically equivalent to B[L] if 
for all wfL, IW >N, 
1 
T INA = yl - PrCB(w) =.vlI <m. 
(3) A[L] = C(k,N+?[L] or A[L] is (k, N)-computationafly equivalent to 
B[L] if for all circuits, C, of size at most I wlk, and all w E L, I WI 2 N, 
where C,,,.,,) denotes the probability that C outputs 1 on input y when Y is chosen 
according to A(w), and P&,,,) is defined similarly with respect to B(w). 
We have already seen what it means for an interacting prover-verifier pair to be 
an interactive proof for a language. In a cryptographic setting, however, we may 
require more from our protocol than just completeness and soundness. We may 
want the prover to give nothing to the verifier that the verifier could not have 
computed itself. To formalize this Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [S] introduced 
the important definition of zero-knowledge. We need the weakest form of zero- 
knowledge so let us start by introducing it. 
The key concept for zero-knowledge is that of a simulator. A simulator, M, is a 
random Turing machine that produces strings, i.e., “conversations,” in expected 
polynomial time. Let M(w) be the random variable associated with A4 on input hi’. 
Recall that P+-+ V(w) is the random variable associated with the conversations 
produced by P H V on input w. We say that P is perfect zero-knowledge for I/ on 
L if there exists a simulator, M, such that M[ L] -p P t-) V[L]. Define the class 
TVPZK, Trusted Verifier Perfect Zero-Knowledge, to be those languages, L, for 
which there exists an interactive prover-verifier pair, Ptt V, such that: 
( 1) P ++ V is (1 - 2 -“)-complete on L, 
(2) V is (1 - 2-“)-sound on L, and 
(3) P is perfect zero-knowledge for V on L. 
Call such a P H V a trusted verifier perfect zero-knowledge proof for L. 
We can also define Trusted Verifier Statistical Zero-Knowledge, TVSZK, and 
Trusted Verifier Computational Zero-Knowledge, TVCZK. P is statistical (computa- 
tional) zero-knowledge for I/ on L if for all k there exists a simulator, M, and an 
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integer, N, such that M[L] is (k, N)-statistically ((k, N)-computationally) equiva- 
lent to PO V[L]. Define the class TVSZK (TVCZK) to be those languages, L, for 
which there exists an interactive prover-verifier pair, Ptt V, such that: 
(1) Pt* V is (1 -2-“)-complete on L, 
(2) V is (1 - 2 -“)-sound on L, and 
(3) P is statistical (computational) zero-knowledge for V on L. 
Call such a P++ V a trusted verifier statistical (computational) zero-knowledge 
proof for L. Although we have no results for computational zero-knowledge, we give 
that definition for the sake of completeness so the reader can compare the different 
definitions. 
Besides requiring that a pair, P e, V, be a trusted verifier zero-knowledge proof 
for a language, in a cryptographic setting we may require even more. For example, 
P cannot be sure that it is interacting with V, the verifier of the interactive proof. 
P may be interacting with another verifier, V’, which by deviating from the 
protocol can extract additional “knowledge” from P. This leads to the normal, 
more restrictive, definition of zero-knowledge where no verifier should be able to 
gain any additional “knowledge” from P. However, since our proof already works 
for the less restrictive notion of zero-knowledge we do not need the more restrictive 
definitions and hence we refer the interested reader to [S] and to [9, 14, 151 for 
a discussion of the definitions. 
Fortnow [7] proved that if L admits a polynomial round proof which is perfect 
or statistical zero-knowledge for a trusted verifier then the complement of L is in 
IP[2]. Our main result is that under the same assumption, L itself is in IP[2]. 
We prove the main theorem in Section 5. The proof is quite technical and hence 
we give an intuitive overview of the proof in the next section. 
3. OUTLINE OF PROOF; STRUCTURE OF SIMULATOR 
For the time being let us consider languages in TVPZK. Let L be such a 
language, let P c-) V be the interactive proof recognizing L, and let M be the perfect 
zero-knowledge simulator for Pt, V, i.e., Pt* V[L] fp M[LJ. Further assume 
that M runs in polynomial time rather than expected polynomial time. Our goal is 
to show that L can also be recognized by a bounded round interactive proof. Alice, 
or A, is the prover in the bounded round proof and Bob, or B, is the verifier. In 
conversations produced by the simulator, M, we say that the prover-moves in the 
conversation are produced by a virtual prover, P’, and the verifier-moves are 
produced by a virtual verifier, V’. We often write this as M= P’ ++ V’ where the ’ 
indicates that P’c* v’ is not a true interactive prover-verifier pair. To summarize, 
L is recognized by P c-) V; M is the zero-knowledge simulator which we think of as 
P’ tf V’; and our goal is to construct a bounded round proof, A CI B, that also 
recognizes L. 
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Recall that V’s moves are labeled x and P’s moves are labeled y. Let sk be the 
string produced by the first k interactions of the P ++ V protocol, sk = x, y, . . ya , 
where qk = xk for k odd or y, for k even. Without loss of generality assume that C 
sends its coins, r, to P on the very last move. Let d(n) + 1 be the total number of 
interactions where d(n) is even. We abbreviate the entire dialogue, So,,,), Y, as s. r. 
Recall that P ++ V(M’) is a random variable. We are often interested in the event 
where the entire conversation is S, r, i.e., that P c-* V( MI) = S, r. In addition, we arc 
interested in the event where the first k interactions are sk and V has coins r. This 
event is written as P +-+ P’(w) = sk*, r. Finally, we are also interested in the event 
P- V(\V) = .sk*, *, i.e., the first k interactions yield sL. We use similar notation to 
signify the same events for M(M’). 
Recall that the verifier’s j+ 1st move is a function of the input, its random bits, 
and the previous 2j interactions, We denote this formally as V( N’, r. x2,) = xzi + , for 
0<2j<d(i(n). 
DEFINITION. A conversation, s, r, output by the simulator is uulid if the moves 
of V’ are the same as the moves that the real V would make if it were playing with 
coins r. That is, s, r is valid if V(IC, r, s2,) =x2,+, for 0 6 2j< d(n). 
Let us look at the behavior of M on input u’. By definition of perfect zero- 
knowledge, when’w E L the conversations of P f-, V and P’ t* V’ have the same dis- 
tribution. Hence, M will output valid conversations with probability 1 and output 
accepting conversations with probability at least 1 - 2 -‘I. Also, the moves of P’ 
must be made with the same probababilities as the moves of P. This is made more 
formal later. 
When M’ 6 L there are two cases. Either A4 outputs valid accepting conversations 
with high probability or it does not. The latter case immediately implies that ~‘4 L. 
Let us look at the former case more closely. By definition of an interactive proof, 
if ~‘4 L then for all provers, Q, the probability that Q t-f V accepts is at most 2 ‘I. 
But P’ convinces V’ to accept with high probability. P’ can gain such an advantage 
over any real prover, Q, since P’ can “see” r of V’ (since P’ tt V’ is actually one 
machine, M, by definition), whereas Q can only infer certain properties of V’s coins 
given the conversation so far. 
Having discerned the gross behavior of M on input u’ we can give a very broad 
outline of the interactive proof between Alice and Bob, A ++ B. On input 1%’ 
(1) Bob will try to convince himself that M(Iv) outputs valid accepting 
conversations with high probability, and 
(2) Alice will try to convince Bob that P’ is not taking advantage of the fact 
that P’ “sees” the coins of V’. 
Bob will accept )t’ only if he is convinced of both (1) and (2). 
A broad outline of the proof that A tf B recognizes L is as follows. When M’ E L. 
M(w) does output valid accepting conversations with high probability and so Bob 
will succeed in convincing himself in (1). Furthermore, P’ makes moves with the 
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same distribution as the real P and so Alice will succeed in convincing Bob in (2). 
When w $ L, if M does not output valid accepting conversations with high probabil- 
ity then Bob wil not succeed in (1). If M does output valid accepting conversations 
with high probability then by the above discussion P’ must be taking advantage of 
the fact that it “sees” r of V’. Hence, A will not succeed in (2). 
Let us make the above discussion more formal. In order to simplify notation let 
us state once and for all that we implicitly consider only nonempty sets or events 
with positive probability. It follows that all conditional probabilities are well 
defined as are the logarithms of the size of sets. 
DEFINITION. Let clSk be the set of all the verifier’s coins that are consistent with 
the partial conversation sk. That is, a, is the set of all r such that V(w, r, szi) = 
x2i+l for 0<2i<k. 
Note that if the last move of sk is a verifier-move, i.e., k is odd, then ~1, = askY for 
all y. This is due to the fact that the prover’s move y does not affect which coins 
are consistent with the verifier’s moves in the string sk. 
Observe that since V’s coins are uniformly distributed, for any partial conversa- 
tion, sIk ~, , all r that are consistent with sZk _ I are equally likely. That is, 
1 
Pr[Pct V(W)=S~~-~*, rlP4-i V(w)=szkhl*, *] =- 
lasZkm,l 
for all r E aszk-, and the probability is zero otherwise. Recall from above that 
a m-l =a S2k-, .“. Hence 
1 
Pr[PoV(w)=s,,_,y*,rJP~V(w)=s,,_,y*,*]=- 
las2k_S 
for all r E ask-, and the probability is zero otherwise. The above identities imply that 
for all moves y of the prover 
Pr[Ptr V(w)=~,,~,y*,rIPt+ V(w)=s,,-,*,r] 
=Pr[Pt, V(w)=s,,-,y*, *IPtt V(W)=S*~-~*, *] 
for all rEaSzkm,. This motivates the following definition: 
DEFINITION. Given partial conversation szkp 1 a move y by P’ is honest if 
Pr[P’ t* v’(w) = s2k ~ 1 y*, r 1 P’ c-) v’(w) = szk _, *, r] 
=Pr[P’t, V’(w)=s2k-ly*,*IP’H V’(w)=szkdl*, *] 
for all rEarZk-,. 
In other words, a move y is honest if for all r the probability that P’ plays y given 
that sZkp I has been played so far and v’ has coins r is equal to the probability that 
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P”s move is y given only that the conversation thus far is szk ~~ , . That is, P”s move 
is based only on the conversation so far and not upon additional information about 
r. By definition of PZK, Pr[ P’ ++ V’=s, r] =Pr[Po V=s, r] for all .r, r when 
M? E L. It follows that all of P”s moves are honest when w E L. 
We say that P’ cheats on .szk- i y*, r if the first conditional probability is much 
greater than the second. That is, P’ cheats on move y if it does use additional infor- 
mation about r. For the sake of the analysis we actually take the logarithms of the 
probabilities. 
DEFINITION. P’ c-cheats on .yzk , y*, r if 
log(Pr[P’++V’(w)=s,,~, y*,rIP’ttV’(w)=s,, ,*,r]) 
3log(Pr[P’ttV’(w)=s,,~,y*,*IP’~V’(w)=s~~ ,*,*I)+“. 
When w $ L we prove that if M(w) outputs valid accepting conversations with 
high probability then P’ cheats a great deal on average. This is made precise in 
Lemma 5.3. 
The goal of the interactive proof between Alice and Bob is to distinguish between 
P’ playing honestly everywhere and P’ cheating a great deal on average. With 
Alice’s help Bob will recognize when P’ is honest and will accept. However, Alice 
will not be able to fool Bob into accepting very often when P’ cheats a great deal 
on average. 
Remark. It is interesting to note that the reason the proof does not work for 
computational zero-knowledge is that the virtual prover cheats also in the case 
when MJ E L. 
The probabilities used in the definition of cheating are actually ratios of the sizes 
of certain sets, which we now define. Let R be the simulator’s coin, IRI = y(n), 
where q(n) is a polynomial. Let fl,Y, and b,,.,, be the sets of R for which 
M(M: R) = So *, * or sx- *, r respectively. With these definitions, P’ c-cheats on 
szkm , y*, r if 
(1% lPJZk&lV*.rl -1% I&-,*,,I)40g IPJ21m,j.l -log Ip.szi.~,I)>/~. 
The following section deals with the aformentioned subprotocols which prove 
upper and lower bounds on the size of sets. 
4. UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS PROTOCOLS 
Let us first consider a subprotocol for proving lower bounds on the size of sets. 
It is based on a lemma of Sipser [16] and uses universal hashing [6]. 
Suppose CC zk, where membership in C is testable in polynomial time. (The 
protocol can easily be modified to work when membership in C is testable in non- 
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deterministic polynomial time but this does not concern us here.) Let H be a k x h 
Boolean matrix and let h: Zk --) Zb be defined by matrix multiplication modulo 2, 
h(x) = xH. The protocol “P proves JCI > 2”’ is as follows: 
(1) V picks a random k x b matrix H and a random element z of Ch. V sends 
H and z to P. 
(2) P responds with CEZ~. 
(3) Vaccepts iff cECand h(c)=z. 
LEMMA 4.1. If P plays optimally then 
(1) Pr[ V accepts] 2 1 - (2’/ICJ). 
(2) Pr[ V accepts] < IC1/2’. 
Proof. Let us first prove (1). Let S be the number of elements that map onto 
the randomly chosen z. S is a random variable and p(S) = 1 Cl 2 pb. Since if ci # c2 
the probability that h(c,) = h(c2) = z is 2-2b we have that a’(S) = ICI (2-‘- 2-*‘). 
Using Chebychev’s inequality this implies that Pr[S = 0] Q ICI (2pb - 2-2b)/ 
((I Cl 2 pb)2 < 2’/lCl. This implies (1) since whenever S # 0, P can make V accept. 
Part (2) follows from the fact that for a fixed element weCk the probability that 
h(w) = z for a fixed h and a random z is l/2’. l 
Next we present a protocol developed by Fortnow [7] for proving upper bounds 
on the size of sets. Suppose the verifier has a random element, c, of the set C E Zk. 
It is crucial that P has no information about c other than the fact that it lies in C. 
Define “P proves I Cl < 2”’ as follows: 
(1) V picks a random k x b matrix H and calculates h(c) = z. V sends H and 
z to P. 
(2) P sends a to V. 
(3) V accepts iff a = c. 
LEMMA 4.2. If P plays optimally then 
(1) Pr[Vaccepts] > 1 -(ICI - 1)/2’. 
(2) Pr[Vaccepts]dg**/(ICl-l), whereg=3+$. 
Proof: The proof of (1) is as follows. P will certainly be able to answer with an 
a equal to c whenever none of the elements in C - {c} collide with h(c) = z. This 
event occurs with probability at least 1 - (I Cl - 1)/2’ since for a fixed c and w in 
Zk, the probability that h(w) = h(c) is l/2’. 
The proof of (2) is as follows. Let S be the number of elements of C which map 
to z. Then by a simple argument 
Pr[Vaccepts],< F IPr[S=j]<Pr[SGil+f 
j-11 
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for all i. Again we apply Chebychev’s inequality. Note that p(S) = 1 + (/Cl - 1)/2” 
and a’<~. So, for i<p 
prCs~i]dPr[~-S~~-i]~~ 
(p - i)” 
For i = (2/( 3 f fi)) p we get 
Pr [ I/ accepts] d 
(3 + J3, 2h 
IC/-1 ’ 
5. PROOF OF MAIN THEOREM 
In this section we give the proof of our main theorem. Initially we assume that 
the simulator is polynomial time and the protocol is perfect zero-knowledge. In the 
end of the section we take care of the complications which arise when the protocol 
is statistical zero-knowledge and the simulator is expected polynomial time. Let us 
start by stating the theorem. 
THEOREM 5.1. If L is recognized by an interactive proqf which is statistical zero- 
knowledge for a trusted verifier where the simulator runs in expected pol.vnomial time 
then L can be recognized by a two-round interactive pro?f: 
Call the prover and verifier recognizing the language P,, and I’, and call the 
simulator M,. Recall that the probability of error in the protocol is at most 2 ‘I 
and the number of rounds is d(n), where n is the length of the input. Run this 
protocol d(n) times in parallel and make the verifier accept if it accepts in a 
majority of the subprotocols. Call this new protocol P++ I/. Note that it is still per- 
fect zero-knowledge for trusted verifier: the new simulator, 44, just runs the old 
simulator d(n) times and takes majority. It is easy to show that the probability of 
error for the new protocol is at most Zpcnd(“’ for some L’ > 0. We keep this value of 
c fixed from now on. We denote the number of coins that V uses by I(n) and the 
number of coins M uses by q(n). 
Observe here that it is crucial that we are working with trusted verifier simula- 
tions since it is probably not true in general that running several zero-knowledge 
protocols in parallel gives a zero-knowledge protocol. 
For the sake of the following two lemmas, assume that M always produces valid 
accepting conversations. Later we discuss how to modify the lemmas when this 
assumption is removed. Let Q(s) denote the probability that S appears as partial 
conversation in the conversation output by the simulator. Here S takes any of 
the values (sZk ~ ,), (sZk ~~, y), (sZkp 1 *, r), and (sZI ~, J’*, r). Using the notation of 
Section 3 define 
F. = Wag IB*.,I -q(n)) 
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where E is the expectation over a random partial conversation output by the 
simulator. Similarly define 
Go = -l(n) 
and 
G,=-Wog IBszkm,yl -1% ID,,,-,I). 
Also let G = C$fr Gk and F = C$:),f Fk. 
The intuition behind these definitions is that F- G is the expectation of the total 
amount of cheating by P’ on all its moves in a random conversation of the 
simulator. With these definitions we can characterize the behavior of the simulator 
with the following two lemmas. 
LEMMA 5.2. Zf w E L then G = F. 
LEMMA 5.3. uw+!L then F-G>cnd(n). 
Proofs. Lemma 5.2 follows clearly from the discussion in Section 3 since when 
w E L, P’ does not cheat and Gk = Fk for all k. To prove Lemma 5.3 we first 
establish the two facts described below. 
Fact 5.4. F= C,,, Q(s, I) log Q(s, v), where, according to our previous conven- 
tions, the sum is only over conversations which have a positive probability of being 
produced by the simulator. 
This is a consequence of the definitions since 
d(n)/2 
F= c Fk 
k=O 
= If; (c m rwg lPs2k-,Y2k*.rl -log lL*A) 
3, r
+ 1 Qb r)(log lB,,,l -q(n)) 
s, r
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Now since we have assumed that M always makes valid moves, it follows that 
lP.w m,.2k*.‘l = IPszrL,.“2kx*,r 2 1 where x is the unique move that I/ would make with 
coins Y after the partial conversation sZk _ iyZk. Using this fact the above sum 
telescopes to log Ifi,,,\ -q(n) and this is precisely log Q(s, u). 
To get a similar formula for G let us examine the behavior of a new prover P. 
which uses the output of the simulator to play against the true verifier V. On partial 
conversation sZk _, P makes the move y,, with probability I Ps2, , V2kl/l B,72k ~, I which 
it can easily do since it is all powerful. If Pr[P++ V= .r, r] is nonzero then it can 
be expanded as 
Pr[ V has coins r] x n Pr[P plays y,, I p tt V= >yZk ~, and V has coins r]. 
k=l 
By our previous comments the probability that p plays y,, given that S2k , has 
been played so far is the same as the probability that p plays yZk given that Sag- , 
has been played so far and V has coins Y for any r consistent with sZk , Let 
R(s, Y) = Pr[ptr V= s, r]. It follows that log R(s, v) is equal to 
d(n )i2 
-l(n)+ c (log IPFziL,1.2kl -lo!%! IBW ,I). 
k=l 
This establishes the following fact. 
Fact 5.5. G = C,,r Q(s, Y) log R(s, r). Again, the sum is only over s, r such that 
Q(.s, Y) > 0. Note here that whenever Q(.Y, r) > 0 we also have R(s, Y) > 0 and hence 
the given sum is finite. 
Observe that when w C$ L the probability that V accepts when interacting with p 
is at most 2 c”d’n) Hence, the C R(s, Y) over s, r with Q(s, r) > 0 is at most 2 ~cnd”f). 
Since F- G = C e(s, r) log(Q(s, r)/R(s, r)) ( over the appropriate s, r) Lemma 5.3 
follows from Lemma 5.6 below. 
LEMMA 5.6. Let Cy=, p, = 1 and X7= 1 q, = q, where pi > 0 und q, > 0 for all i, 
then CT”= 1 P, log (pJqJ 2 b(l/q). 
Proof (Lemma 5.6). Fix qi for all i. Let us minimize the expression over all 
values of p, satisfying CyZ, pi= 1. The ith component of the gradient is 
log e(ln (p,/qi) + 1) and thus the only interior extreme point is found for p, = qiiq 
for all i. This is easily checked to be the global minimum. 1 
Before we continue, let us get rid of the assumption that M always produces valid 
accepting conversations. We handle this by making B reject whenever he sees a 
conversation which is not valid or not accepting. We have to analyze what effect 
this has. Say that a conversation is OK if it is valid and accepting. 
Fix t to be a polynomial. Suppose B picks I WI t( 1~1) random R and runs M. If 
IL’ E L then with probability >, 1 - 2-l”” /ua\ t( 1~1) all these conversations will be 
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accepting. Also all conversations will be valid and that is enough to prove 
Lemma 5.2, and thus in this case there is no major difference. 
When w $ L there are two cases, either the fraction of OK conversations is at 
least 1 - (l/t( 1 w( )), or it is not. In the latter case B will, except with exponentially 
small probability, see a conversation which is not OK. In the former case the 
previous analysis is almost correct; we just need a few minor changes. 
Fact 5.4 is no longer exactly true and we need a slight modification. In the sum 
(*) let us distinguish two kinds of terms, namely the ones corresponding to s, r 
which are OK conversations and the ones which are not OK. The first kind of 
terms gives rise to a sum like the one in Fact 5.4 where the summation is limited 
to OK conversations. The other kind of terms gives a contribution which is at most 
O(q(n)lO)). 
Fact 5.5 remains valid but here it is also convenient to split the sum into terms 
corresponding to OK s, r and conversations which are not OK. This second sum 
is as before bounded by O(q(n)/t(n)). On the other hand when we are summing 
over OK conversations we can use Lemma 5.6. Here we need the modification that 
the sum of Q(s, Y) over all OK conversations is slightly less than 1, but this again 
is an error term of size bounded by the same bound. Thus we obtain a weaker ver- 
sion of Lemma 5.3 with end(n) replaced by end(n) - O(q(n)/t(n)). For l(n) 9 q(n) 
we can ignore the error term. Since B will see many more than q(n) conversations 
during the protocol and he will reject if he sees a conversation which is not OK we 
can assume throughout that Lemma 5.3 holds. 
Now we are ready to define the protocol for recognizing L. It will consist of sub- 
protocols estimating upper bounds for Fk and lower bounds for Gk. On input w, 
/WI =n: 
(1) For i= 1, . . . . 4q(n)‘, B picks a random Ri and runs M to get an ri. B 
sends this ri to A and A responds with bi and proves that lb*,,,1 ~2’~. B computes 
f. = 1/4q(n)2 Cz;)2 b,- q(n). 
(2) For i= 1, . . . . 4q(n)‘, and k = 1, . . . . d(n)/2, B picks a random Rlk’ and runs 
M to get an SZk- 1, y2k 
that I/?,,,_,] < 2b!k). 
and r. B sends qk-, to A. A responds with b(k’ and proves 
TF B also sends y,, to A and A responds with ci”’ and proves 
that MS,, m,?.-2kl 2 2’1 . B computes ek = 1/4q(n)2 C4y”;‘* (cik)- bjk’). 
(3) For i = 1, . . . . 44(n)‘, and k = 1, . . . . d(n)/2, B picks a random Rik) and runs 
M to get an Sag-,, y2k and r. B sends sZk-, , y2k and r to A. A responds with bjk’ 
and elk’ and proves that Ip,,,-, y2k.,rl < 2’1”’ and Ifi,,-, *,J > 2’jil’. B computes 
pk = 1/4q(n)2 C4y’;)* (bjk) - cik)). 
(4) B computes f= C$:r jk and G = -I(n) + C,“(:‘{’ Gk and accepts iff 
@- G d (c/2)&(n), A has been successful in all subprotocols and all the R that B 
has picked corresponds to valid accepting conversations. 
To establish that the protocol recognizes the language L, we often use a standard 
Chernoff bound. Let us prove it for the sake of completeness. 
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LEMMA 5.1. Let X he a random variable 0 < X < K and let E(X) = u. Then given 
s independent observations Xi, i= 1 . . .s gfX 
Proof. To estimate the above probability we look at exponential moments. 
To estimate this quantity we use 
LEMMA 5.8. Jf a random variable Y satisfies E(Y) = 0 and / YI 6 c f 1 then 
E(eY) < eCZ. 
Proof (Lemma 5.8). We use eY< 1 + Y+ Y* which is valid for 1 Yl < 1 and 
e-‘2 1 +x valid for any x. This gives 
E(eY)< 1 +E(Y’)d 1 +c’<e”. [ 
Now we can prove Lemma 5.7. For T> K the lemma is clear and otherwise we 
put A= T/2K2. In the calculation of the exponential moment we can apply 
Lemma 5.8 with Y = A(11 - Xi) and c = iwK and we get E(e”(“’ pZim 1 xi’) < c+“~*. This 
implies that Pr[sp - XI= 1 Xi > ST] < esizK2 ‘IT = e sTZ’4KZ. Using i. = - T/2K’ one 
gets the same bound for I;=, Xi being unusually large, and Lemma 5.7 is 
proved. i 
After these preliminaries let us establish that the protocol is correct when 11‘ E L. 
LEMMA 5.9. If w E L then for sufficiently large n the probability that A can muke 
B accept is > &. 
Proof. First observe that the probability that B sees a conversation which is not 
OK is exponentially small and hence for sufficiently large n this is less than &. 
We present a strategy for A that, given B never sees a conversation which is not 
OK, will make B accept 9 times out of 10. Whenever A is supposed to prove an 
upper bound for the size of a set whose true size is T, A states that the size of the 
set is at most 240q(n)2 d(n) T and then proceeds to follow the protocol given in 
Section 4. Similarly when A is asked for a lower bound she states the bound 
max( 1, T/240q(n)2d(n)) and then follows the protocol of Section 4. 
Given that A follows this strategy let us analyze the probability that B will 
accept. Since A proves bounds on 8q(n)2d(n)+4q(n)2d 12q(n)* d(n) sets, the 
probability that she will ever fail in one of the protocols is by Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 
bounded by 12q(n)2d(n)/240q(n)2d(n) 7 &. Whenever Alice is successful in all 
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these protocols B will get a value of pk which is within 2 iog(240q(n)2d(n)) of 
wm2 CiY (lo&? IBsg~_,y*,r I -log IB&,*,, I). By Lemma 5.7 this implies that 
Pr[(pk - Fk) > 2 log(240q(n)*d(n)) + 4 log d(n)] d 2d(n)- *. 
By a similar argument we get that 
PrCG - e,) a 2 h@W(n)*d(n)) +4 log d(n)] < 2d(n))2. 
Thus with probability at least 1 - (4/d(n)) the reverse inequalities hold for all k and 
since F= G we get by summing that P- 6 d O(d(n) log q(n)d(n)) with this prob- 
ability. Since log(q(n)d(n)) = o(n) this completes the proof of Lemma 5.9. 1 
Next we establish that the protocol is correct also for w $ L. 
LEMMA 5.10. Zf w +! L then for sufficiently large n the probability that A can make 
B accept is d &. 
ProoJ: As noted in the discussion before we defined the protocol, we can assume 
that most conversations are valid and accepting and hence that Lemma 5.3 is true. 
For A to succeed in convincing B to accept with high probability either Rik’ must 
be favorable to A or A must claim lower (upper) bounds which are much larger 
(smaller) than the actual size of the sets. The former happens with very small 
probability and the latter will cause B to reject the lower (upper) bound protocol 
with high probability. 
Suppose that A during the protocol claims a bound which is a factor 128 better 
than the true bound (this refers to either upper or lower bounds). Then the 
probability that A will get caught in trying to prove this bound is by Lemmas 4.1 
and 4.2 at least g. Thus if A tries to make $k smaller than 
l/%?(n)* c4y’? (log Ik$~m, yt,rl - log Ip,t~~, .,J) - 14 s h e will fail with probability g. 
On the other hand by Lemma 5.7 
Thus if A has probability at least & of succeeding in her upper and lower bounds 
proofs we have pk > E;,- 14 - 4 log d(n) with probability 1 -d(n)-*. Thus 
fi> F--(d(n) log d(n)) with probability at least 1 -l/d(n). Similarly we get 
G < G + O(d(n) log d(n)) with the same probability. If both these inequalities hold 
E- G Z F- G - O(d(n) log d(n)) and now Lemma 5.3 implies Lemma 5.10. 1 
Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10 imply Theorem 5.1 in the case of perfect zero-knowledge 
and M being polynomial time. To see this we have only to verify that the protocol 
can be implemented in two rounds. However, by the result of Babai [2] it is 
sufficient to show that one can implement the protocol in a constant number of 
rounds. But this is clear since we run all the subprotocols for different i and k in 
parallel. 
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Remark. Our constant round protocol for L and subsequent analysis are much 
more complicated than Fortnow’s protocol for L. This is for a fundamental reason. 
In order for a prover, A, to convince a verifier, B, that x 4 L, A need only show that 
the simulator occasionally cheats. A can simply show B a few partial conversations 
and prove that the simulator cheats on these. However, in order for A to convince 
B that x E L, A must convince B that the simulator is behaving honestly almost 
everywhere. 
Not surprisingly, the present framework is general enough to prove Fortnow’s 
result as well. We modify our current protocol for recognizing L to get an inefficient 
protocol for recognizing t as follows. Change every lower (upper) bound sub- 
protocol to an upper (lower) bound subprotocol. The goal of the new prover is to 
show that p- @ is large. The new verifier will accept when it convinced that this 
is the case. The analysis for this new protocol is nearly identical to that described 
above. 
This finishes the analysis for the cases where the simulator is polynomial time 
and perfect zero-knowledge. Let us see how to take care of the complications that 
arise when the simulator is statistical zero-knowledge. 
Statistical zero-knowledge. For statistical zero-knowledge the same protocol 
works. Even the analysis for w 6 L is the same since the zero-knowledge constraint 
on the behavior of the simulator only applies to M’ E L. However, when br E L 
the analysis does need a slight modification. It is no longer true that G = F since P’ 
no longer behaves exactly like P. However, the difference is small and can 
be taken care of as follows. Let T(S) denote the probability that S appears 
as a partial conversation in a conversation between V and P. Define 
Fk = .Wx(T(.b- 1 y*, r)) - log(T(s2,-, *, r))) and G, = E(log(T(s,, , I’)) - 
log( T(s,, ]))) where the expected value is taken with respect to random .s-~ , , 
~9 and r produced by P and V. It is clear that Fk = c,. 
Writing everything explicitly we have 
Fk = 1 T(szk_ I Y*, rNlog(Th I Y*, r)) - log(T(.s2, 1*, r))). 
.\?A I, .1.1 
We know that C,,,-,,y,r 127(“) IP.~Zk-,l.J - Th. 1 Y*, r)i G (l/t(n)) for any poly- 
nomial t. Since the derivative of p log p is logp + log e this implies that 
IFk - Fk;kl < o(q(n)/t(n)) for any polynomial t. We get the same result for /G, - t?,I 
and thus IG - FI < 0(1/t(n)) for any polynomial t. 
Expected polynomial time simulator. Suppose M runs in expected time q(n). The 
number of coins that A4 uses is potentially unlimited. Hence, we do not have well- 
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defined finite sets of the simulator’s coins on which to run our upper and lower 
bound subprotocols. We can take care of this problem as follows. 
Redefine Fk to be E(log Pr[y,, =y 1 sZk- r, r]) and similarly let Gk = 
E(log Pr[y,, =y ( SZk- r]). These definitions agree with the old definitions in the 
case when A4 is polynomial time. For any partial conversation S redefine p, to be 
the set of coins of length lOq(n) such that given these coins A4 halts within time 
lOq(n) and produces the partial conversation S. Observe that with this definition 
the new definitions of Fk and G, no longer agree with the old definitions. 
The protocol is now the same as before having A prove bounds for the p-sets 
with the new definitions. When B picks a random R there is the possibility that M 
will not halt. In this case B will just pick another R and try again. If B fails n times 
consecutively it gives up and rejects the input. 
B will reject for this reason with exponentially small probability since the prob- 
ability of M halting within time lOq(n) is at least &. Thus this will not change the 
performance of the protocol. 
The intuition behind the protocol also working when using the modified sets is 
that 18sl/2 lo+) is a fairly good approximation for the probability that the partial 
conversation S appears. Before we analyzed all other aspects of the protocol when 
2-i”4(“)/Is is equal to h t is probability; we need now just analyze the additional 
problems that appear from this intuition not being exactly correct. 
Let Q(S) be the probability that M outputs the partial conversation S. Thus the 
intuition we need to verify is that this is close to 22roq(“) //IsI. Observe that we 
always have Q(S) 3 2 - lo+) 1p.J. We need to prove that A can do almost as well 
as before when w EL and not too much better than before when w $ L. Let us start 
with the former. 
Alice will not do as well when she cannot prove good upper bounds on 
&?hk - 1 Y*, I) and Q&k -- 1) or when she cannot prove good lower bounds on 
Q(sZk- r *, r) and Q(sZk ~ r y). Since the sizes of the B sets can only be smaller than 
they should be, Alice will always do as well in proving upper bounds as she did 
before. For the lower bounds we claim that with probability at most 10/9D B will 
pick an R which gives rise to sZk- r y which satisfies 
The reason for this is that if we let 1’ denote the sum over all sZk- ,, y satisfying 
(**) then 
Now the above claim follows from the fact that the probability that M halts within 
time lOq(n) is at least &. The same statement is of course true for sTk-, y. Now if 
we choose D = 240q(n)*d(n) we know that with probability c$, B will never choose 
a R!k) satisfying (**). But in such a case A will be able to get G and P within 
O(dtn) log(q(n)d(n))) of the values she can get when ii4 is polynomial time. Thus 
Lemma 5.9 also follows in the case of expected polynomial time. 
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Now consider the case when WC L. We must establish that A cannot do too 
much better than before. This would happen if she could prove better upper bounds 
for Q(szkP, y*, r) and Q(.s,,- ,) or if she could prove better lower bounds for 
Q(szk ~ I *, r) and Q(szk ~, y). The second possibility can never occur and for the 
first possibility we get the same analysis as above. 
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